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Abstract  
Various data scandals have raised people’s risk perceptions all around the world. Due to the sensitivity of 
location information, these concerns are particularly significant in the context of mobile location-based 
services (LBS) and are generally considered a major inhibiting factor for their usage. The aim of this study 
is to investigate different risk facets that encompass a special type of LBS usage, namely location-based 
social networking service (LBSNS) usage. Based on previous literature, eight risk facets are revealed. The 
qualitative study provided support for five of the identified risk facets, namely: secondary use risk, 
provider misrepresentation risk, social risk, property risk and surveillance risk. Additionally, perceived 
risk of stalking was identified as a new risk facet and the concept of social risk was refined into three sub-
categories. This study contributes to extant research by further specifying perceived risk which leads to a 
better understanding of the concept of LBSNS usage. 
Keywords 
Location-based social networking services, check-in services, risks, qualitative study.  
Introduction 
“NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide” (Washington Post 2013), “Apple, Google Collect User 
Data” (Wall Street Journal 2013), “Snapchat Breach Exposes Weak Security” (NY Times 2014): these are 
only a few headlines which demonstrate that advancements in mobile technologies have been 
accompanied by increased privacy concerns (Xu et al. 2009). However, location-based services (LBS), 
which utilize user’s location information to provide value-added services (Giaglis et al. 2003), have finally 
become the prophesied “killer app” (Junglas and Watson 2008). Just recently a comprehensive research 
study in Germany revealed that 73% of Germans have already used LBS before (Mündel et al. 2013). Since 
smartphone sales have been forecasted to top one billion units sold in 2013 (Gartner 2013) this number is 
likely to further rise. Moreover, worldwide LBS revenues are expected to reach a sales volume of $13.5 
billion in 2015 (Gartner 2012). This tremendous sales volume and business potential of LBS, arguably, 
indicates that providers may want to collect, store and use the personal location data of their users to gain 
a competitive advantage. 
Users privacy concerns have been identified as a major deterrent for adoption of mobile services (e.g., 
Bouwman et al. 2007; Zhou 2012). Due to the complexity of privacy, researchers are inclined to use 
privacy-related proxies to measure privacy concern (Xu et al. 2011). Although these scales (e.g., CFIP; 
Smith et al. 1996) were adapted and developed to apply in an online (IUIPC; Malhotra et al. 2004) and 
mobile context (MUIPC; Xu et al. 2012), they do not identify specific concerns of users of LBS. In 
contrast, some researchers have dissected risk, which refers to the uncertainty of transactions, to identify 
various risk perceptions (e.g., privacy risk; Featherman and Pavlou 2003).  
However, researchers have not reached consensus and need to clearly identify a significant number of risk 
facets, which are applicable to the context of LBS and are clearly linked to issues affecting users’ privacy 
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concerns. For example, users of push-based LBS may perceive some specific risks as a result of continuous 
tracking of users’ mobile devices inherent in push-based environments (e.g., perceived surveillance). 
Other potential risks might revolve around the possibility of providers’ acting in an opportunistic fashion 
(e.g., sell personal location data to third parties or use it internally for personalized ads) or passing 
sensitive user location information on to government agencies. Other areas of interest to be investigated 
are risks, originating from other users of LBS (e.g., a risk to their personal security or that of their 
possessions), and those arising from the Internet as an uncertain environmental platform for the 
provision of LBS (e.g., hackers). 
Therefore, the purpose of this article is to further advance this stream of research, with emphasis on 
understanding the most salient risk perceptions affecting Location-Based Social Networking Services 
(LBSNS) use context for push- and pull-based applications. Recognizing research on risk, semi-structured 
interviews will be used to examine the applicability of previously revealed risk factors for examining the 
effects on the usage of push- and pull-based LBS. Two prominent services, Find My Friends and 
Foursquare, will be used as an example of a push-based and pull-based LBSNS. 
Theoretical Background 
LBNS 
For the scope of this paper, LBSNS are defined as any mobile social network service which incorporates 
LBS, such as check-in services, in order to enable users to receive personalized value and highly context-
aware services by using positioning technologies (Scellato and Mascolo 2012). Check-in services are LBS 
applications that enable users to “log-in” at nearby places like restaurants, shops, events, etc. LBSNS 
promote the development of networks of mobile entities (users) by displaying their geographic 
information on a map or as a list of status updates, and thereby incorporate location information into 
shared contents (de Souza e Silva and Frith 2010). Based on this characteristic, LBSNS facilitate users to 
localize and interact with each other (de Souza e Silva and Frith 2010). Locations embedded in Social 
Networks can be a stand-alone instant location of an individual, like in a bar at 9 p.m., or a location 
history accumulated over a certain period, such as a GPS trajectory (Zheng 2011,). Social Networks that 
include LBS focus on the individual interests and behavior of consumers to meet their demands, as well as 
utilizing users’ behavior and interests to establish additional relevant information about their geographic 
mobility (Scellato and Mascolo, 2012). In the following, we will analyze LBSNS from an LBS point of view 
(see Table 1) as this represents the key characteristic distinguishing it from traditional SNS. 
According to extant literature in the field of LBS, one can distinguish between location-tracking and 
location-aware services. Location-tracking services supply entities other than the user (i.e. third-parties) 
with the user’s information about his or her location. Location-aware services, in contrast, provide a user 
with personal location data (Barkhuus and Dey 2003). Examples of location-aware services include car 
navigation systems and location-specific store coupons, while a company’s truck-tracking system to 
increase fleet management efficiency is an example of a location-tracking service.  
Similarly, LBS can also be classified as push- and pull-based services (Schnabel 2009). Here, the 
distinction is made between the way information is delivered and acquired in the LBS context. Pull-based 
LBS (also termed overt or reactive LBS) comprise applications where the user actively requests 
information or uses some service based on his or her current location on an one-time basis. For these “on-
demand” services, location information is only useful at the moment of information request (e.g., when a 
user is searching for the nearest gas station) (Xu et al. 2009). In contrast, push-based LBS (also coined 
covert and proactive) provide users with relevant information based on their current location. A user 
initially signs up for a service and agrees to receive location-based information, which is then 
automatically sent to his or her mobile device based on the current position and stated preferences 
(Schnabel 2009). The application, thus, constantly tracks a user’s device via tracking technology (e.g., 
GPS) leading to a significantly lower level of control of push-based services than in pull-based ones (Xu et 
al. 2009; Xu et al. 2010).  
LBSNS comprise services that are able to trace users’ movements and activities and connect them to a 
certain location and time as mediated localities (Roick 2012), also referred to as geosocial networking. 
Geotagging refers to the publication of geographical information merged with digital items (Turner 
 Risk Perceptions in the Case of Check-in Services 
  
 Twentieth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Savannah, 2014 3 
2006). These artifacts can include photos, videos, tweets, etc., which are published on a map or can be 
used in a local search (Roick and Heuser 2013). Shared artifacts that cohere with an actual location are 
labeled as locative media (Roick and Heuser 2013). 
Mobile Social 
Networking 
Services 
+ 
Characteristics of Location-Based Services 
Entity supply Location-aware Location-tracking 
Delivery type Push-based Pull-based 
Focus Locative media Mediated locality 
Referencing 
type 
Self Cross 
Market type Vertical Horizontal 
Direction of 
mapping 
Location of target Targets at location 
Application 
area 
Emergency Navigation Tracking 
Management 
Information Billing Advertisement / 
Entertainment 
Table 1. Potential Composition of Location-Based Social Networking Services (LBSNS) 
LBS are also often classified according to their application area, although researchers use varying 
terminology and number of categories. Summarizing the dominant application areas of LBS, six broad 
categories of services can be identified (cf. D’Roza and Bilchev 2003; Giaglis et al. 2003; Spiekermann 
2004; Steiniger 2006; Xu et al. 2009): emergency, navigation, information, tracking and management, 
billing, advertising and entertainment. 
Since commercial LBS are among the most used (Spiekermann 2004) and since providers’ commercial 
interest may play an important role in creating user privacy concern, this research refers to two 
prominent commercial check-in apps. The push-based LBS application, Find My Friends, was one of the 
first successful commercial LBS with a long history in mobile LBS research (e.g., Barkhuus and Dey 
2003). Foursquare, a popular pull-based mobile LBS with millions of users worldwide was chosen for 
similar reasons. Furthermore, the community aspect of both of these applications allowed for 
comparability, as well as the possibility of gaining another level of concern besides users’ provider-related 
concerns, namely privacy concerns originating from other users whether friends or followers. 
Perceived Risk  
Any kind of transaction – whether receiving goods in exchange for money or obtaining a service as a result 
of disclosing location information – involves a certain amount of risk, where risk relates to uncertainty of 
consequences for the consumer (Chu and Li 2008). Thus, perceived risk is usually considered as the felt 
uncertainty with regard to the potential negative consequences of using a product/service (Featherman 
and Pavlou 2003).  
Risk plays a critical role in the purchase decision-making process (Chu and Li 2008) and, before the 
Digital Age, it was mostly related to the possibility of fraud and poor product quality (Wu and Wang 
2005). Since risk is difficult to assess as an “[…] objective reality” (Pavlou 2003, p.77), the concept of 
perceived risk as a distinct concept from actual risk was established, which is formed among others by 
dispositional factors such as character traits and past experiences (Lo 2010). Thus, perceived risk is an 
“[…] inherently subjective construct” (Yates and Stone 1992, p.5) that refers to a person’s feelings about 
his or her susceptibility to a variety of threats associated with online products or services (Van Slyke 
2006) and the perception of the severity of these threats (Xu et al. 2011), regardless of whether this feeling 
is objectively justified.  
This distinction is especially important since risk perceptions usually determine behavioral intention to 
purchase goods online (Kim et al. 2008), release personal information on the Internet (Malhotra et al. 
2004) or use mobile services such as mobile banking (Luo et al. 2010). Therefore, it can be inferred that 
user risk perceptions also determine usage or non-usage of push- and pull-based LBSNS. Moreover, 
higher perceived risk usually translates into lower probability of an exchange taking place (Gefen et al. 
2003). For example, the higher a user’s perceived risk concerning the disclosure of his or her location 
information to a LBS service provider, the lower the likelihood of that person using the service due to the 
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user’s feeling of the “[…] possibility of loss” (Yates and Stone 1992, p.4). Drawing on Malhotra et al. 
(2004), this study consequently defines perceived risk as an individual’s personal expectation that a high 
potential for loss is associated with the usage of LBS (Malhotra et al. 2004), which is considered as a key 
obstacle for LBSNS usage (Xu et al. 2009). 
Perceived Risk Factors in the Context of LBS 
Although many perceived risks factors have been identified, not all are applicable in the context of mobile 
LBS. Following list of perceived risks will be considered in the context of privacy concerns of push- and 
pull-based LBS in this study.The interaction of user, service and provider of the service is emphasized to 
play an essential role for mobile services adoption inhibitors (Ryschka and Bick 2012). Thus, this relation 
provides an adequate framework for classifying the identified risk facets (see Table 2) in the following. On 
the providers side, users may perceive specific LBS providers as incapable of adequately protecting their 
personal information (Pavlou et al. 2007), lacking sufficient controls (Dinev et al. 2013). This risk 
perception is commonly known as provider performance risk, which is defined as a user’s perceived risk 
that a specific LBSNS provider is technically incapable of protecting his/her personal information, 
including location data, from unauthorized access of outside sources.  
As mentioned in the previous section, users may feel a risk when disclosing personal information or 
engage in some kind of transaction as they expect opportunistic behavior (Dinev and Hart 2006; Dinev et 
al. 2013; Pavlou 2003). Due to the nature of LBS, providers record vast amounts of real-time location 
information, which are highly valuable for businesses or advertisers (Xu et al. 2012). Drawing on prior 
literature, secondary use risk is defined as a user’s perceived risk that service providers will pass their 
personal information on to third parties for personal gain without users’ explicit knowledge or consent.  
Risk Facets Definition Focus 
Provider Performance 
Risk 
A user’s perceived risk that a specific LBS provider is technically incapable of 
protecting his or her personal information, including location data, from 
unauthorized access of outside source. 
Provider 
 
Secondary Use Risk A user’s perceived risk that service providers will pass their personal 
information on to third parties for personal gain without users’ explicit 
knowledge or consent.  
Noncompliance Risk A user’s perceived risk that his or her personal information is used by the 
service itself for other purposes than previously agreed upon.  
Provider 
Misrepresentation Risk 
A user’s perceived risk that more location information will be collected by a 
service than necessary to provide the service in question. 
Mobile Application 
Risk 
A user’s perceived risk of the LBS application malfunctioning and not 
performing as it was designed resulting in loss of privacy. 
Service 
Social Risk A user’s perceived risk that using LBS may lead to embarrassment resulting in 
a loss of privacy. 
User 
Physical Risk A user’s perceived risk for his or her own or other’s physical safety as a result 
of using LBS. 
Property Risk A user’s perceived risk to his or her property as a result of using LBS. 
Surveillance Risk A user’s perceived risk of suffering from the feeling of surveillance by entities 
other than the user as a result of LBS usage. 
Table 2. Risk Facets in the Context of LBSNS Usage 
Similarly, LBS providers may use location information for other purposes than previously stated or agreed 
upon, according to an implied social contract (Malhotra et al. 2004). This study defines the 
noncompliance risk as a user’s perceived risk that his or her personal information is used by the service 
itself for other purposes than previously agreed upon.  
A service provider may misrepresent itself or its actions towards the user (Pavlou et al. 2007) by collecting 
certain user information, although there is not a mutual agreement between them. For example, a LBS 
provider might collect location-based information to sell to third parties or provide personalized 
advertising. Therefore, the provider misrepresentation risk will be defined as a user’s perceived risk that 
more location information will be collected by a service than necessary to provide the service in question. 
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Another factor, predominantly linked to the service itself, is apparent in a mobile environment. 
Malfunctioning and technical glitches of applications could temporarily affect user privacy settings, which 
could have inadvertent consequences for users of LBSNS, for instance, location visibility at undesired 
times or unlimited access to users not explicitly authorized to receive such information. This perceived 
risk is referred to as mobile application risk and defined as a user’s perceived risk of the application 
malfunctioning and not performing as it was designed resulting in loss of privacy (Featherman and Pavlou 
2003). 
Directly linked to the user and its social environment is the facet of social risk. As shown in Table 2 , social 
risk refers to “[t]he risk that using a product or service may lead to embarrassment before one’s social 
group” (Luo et al. 2010, p.226). Dinev et al. (2013) speak of context-specific “information sensitivity” 
which in the context of mobile LBS could easily be translated into location information sensitivity. 
Therefore, this risk factor is also considered valid and is defined as a user’s perceived risk that using LBS 
may lead to embarrassment resulting in a loss of privacy. 
Physical risk has been defined as “[…] the risk to the buyer’s or other’s safety in using products” (Luo et 
al. 2010, p. 226). Physical risk will, therefore, be defined as a user’s perceived risk for his or her own or 
other’s physical safety as a result of using LBS. Additionally, users may perceive a risk concerning their 
property rather than physical safety (e.g., burgling the user’s home), which nonetheless violates a person’s 
feelings of his or her private space. Therefore, property risk will be defined as a user’s perceived risk to his 
or her property as a result of using LBS. 
Due to the nature of LBS the potential for user perceptions of privacy violations through surveillance– 
both by other users, as well as other entities such as companies or government agencies– is obvious (Xu 
and Teo 2004). This surveillance factor may have significant effects on various privacy concerns and could 
prove an important inhibiting factor for the use of both push- and pull-based LBS. As a consequence, this 
study defines surveillance risk as a user’s perceived risk of suffering from the feeling of surveillance by 
entities other than the user as a result of LBS usage. 
Methodology 
Since this study aims at gaining a better understanding of which specific privacy concerns exist for users 
of push- and pull-based LBSNS, an exploratory research approach was considered most appropriate (Hair 
et al. 2011). The preceding literature overview provided the initial indication for further advancing 
knowledge in this field (Hair et al. 2011). On the basis of the risk literature analysis, a number of salient 
risk facets were identified (see Theoretical Background).  
By taking the identified risk factors into account, a guideline for conducting semi-structured interviews 
has been developed in a second step (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). Interviews are considered particularly 
appropriate for the purpose of exploratory studies (Hair et al. 2011). This study opts for “semi-structured 
life world interview[s]” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009) to obtain descriptions of the life world of the 
interviewee in order to interpret the meaning of the described phenomena. They also guarantee flexibility 
in the interview process, allowing the interviewer to ask open-ended questions and follow-up questions to 
elaborate on complex issues (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2005), as well as provide opportunity to identify other 
salient perceived risks originating from the usage of push- and pull-based LBSNS. Therefore, all relevant 
themes for the interview can be covered while changing the sequence and forms of questions to react to 
the interviewee’s specific answers (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009).  
The interviews were conducted according to the seven stages of an interview process: thematizing, 
designing, interviewing, transcribing, analyzing, verifying and reporting (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). 
The first two are concerned with the research design, the next two with data collection and the last one 
with the findings. Thematizing refers to the clarification of the aim of the investigation and posing 
appropriate research questions, while designing relates to posing sensible questions to obtain the 
knowledge sought by conducting the interviews (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009).   
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Data Collection 
All interviews were scheduled in advance and were conducted individually between December 22, 2013 
and January 2, 2014. All thirteen interviews were conducted in German, the native language of all 
interviewees.  
A recent representative study found that 14-29 year old Germans use LBS the most of all age categories in 
Germany (Mündel et al. 2013). Purposeful sampling for this study was established accordingly. 
Furthermore, candidates were required to possess the technical ability to use LBSNS (i.e. owning a 
smartphone with broadband connection) in order to qualify for the interview stage. Thirteen candidates of 
various ages were interviewed, eight males and five females. More than half of the interviewees had 
experience with at least one of the two LBSNS applications (Find My Friends and Foursquare), the rest 
knew and understood their concept, yet were not active users of the applications themselves. This was 
done to gather various opinions and allows for new ideas to enter the discussion. Users with expert 
knowledge of the applications could provide informed opinions. In contrast, non-users might provide 
insights into fears associated with LBSNS usage in general, and might reveal specific fears associated with 
the usage of the examined push- or pull-based LBSNS. Table 3 provides an overview of the interviewees’ 
profiles.  
Participant Age Sex Job Foursquare Find My Friends 
B1 26 F Student User Non-User 
B2 27 M Unemployed Ex-User Non-User 
B3 27 M TV Producer Non-User Non-User 
B4 29 M Lawyer Non-User User 
B5 21 M Student Non-User Non-User 
B6 23 F Student User Non-User 
B7 22 F Events Manager Non-User Non-User 
B8 29 M Searching Non-User User 
B9 23 M Student Non-User Non-User 
B10 24 M Student Non-User Non-User 
B11 27 M Insurance Analyst Non-User User 
B12 26 F Marketing Trainee Non-User Non-User 
B13 26 F Law Clerk User Non-User 
Table 3. Interviewees’ Profiles 
Seven were conducted face-to-face and six via Skype with both parties’ cameras turned on to most 
realistically imitate a face-to-face encounter to take advantage of the extra information gained from social 
cues (e.g., body language; Opdenakker 2006). To ensure reliability and repeatability of the study, each 
interview followed an interview guide and all participants were questioned in private. Additionally, 
interview guidelines were discussed with an academic professional and a practice interview was 
conducted to ensure overall comprehensibility. 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed according to transcription rules of Kuckartz et al. (2007), which 
focus on content rather than context. Transcription followed immediately after each interview so that 
results could be woven immediately into the next interview guidelines. This procedure was followed until 
theoretical saturation was attained. 
Data Analysis 
The coding of the collected data is considered as an essential step for successfully analyzing qualitative 
data and generating new theory (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005). Coding refers to the process of “[…] 
assigning meaningful […] names that reduce data from a large amount of undifferentiated text to a much 
smaller number of relevant and representative chunks” (Hair et al. 2006, p. 282). Therefore, it allows 
rearrangement of the obtained material into categories and thus, reduces the vast amount of unstructured 
data, making it more manageable and comprehensible (Maxwell 2009).  
Coding consists of three subsequent stages: open coding, axial coding and selective coding. Open coding 
describes the process of breaking data down and delineating concepts to stand for blocks of raw data 
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while axial coding consists of the process of relating concepts and categories to each other (Corbin and 
Strauss 2008). The data was coded by sentence or paragraph, as this is considered an especially beneficial 
approach if some categories have already been defined (Corbin and Strauss 2008). During the coding 
process, codes and their relations were continuously adapted. The underlying study used the software 
NVivo 10 to support the coding process.  
Findings 
Secondary Use Risk 
Individuals are not only concerned about LBS providers collecting personal user data, but also about what 
happens to this data once it is collected and if these practices may cause privacy concerns. It appears that 
users are indeed worried about the subsequent use of their personal location data. Users generally see two 
broad risks: first, they are concerned about providers using their private data opportunistically. This 
includes the use of their data to run personalized advertisements, as well as pass information on to third 
parties. Users also worry about providers passing on their personal location information to government 
agencies as part of some sort of compliance, regardless of the legitimacy of it.  
Interview respondents generally consider the idea that service providers may create revenue from user 
information problematic and bothersome. For example, B5 said: “any app where I tend to have the feeling 
that they use it commercially or that could use such information commercially like Facebook [does] I turn 
the location tracking off” (B5). B12 feels “there is a limit to market intelligence” (B12), stating that “even if 
the data is somehow anonymized. I just don’t want that a company can buy: ‘25 to 30 spend an average 30 
minutes a day on the metro’. She claims lack of trust in providers’ proper conduct in this respect to be a 
reason for not using more LBS services. B9 states he perceives a risk of being “used as a user” (B9) by the 
service Foursquare due to personalized apps, but not by Find My Friends due to the lack of space to run 
ads in the app’s interface. Similarly, B4 considers the risk of opportunistic data usage on behalf of 
providers a more salient risk for a service like Foursquare due to the app’s classification as a social 
network: “In such a community I think data is more interesting for providers […]. There, there unfold 
more opportunities to make a deal because a community certainly exchanges more, um what is interesting 
[…] it has got to do with consumption that is much more interesting than Find My Friends, which is 
purely concerned with communication” (B4).  
Similarly, B11 said that he expects that companies can buy user’s personal location information from 
Foursquare: “for example, a big shopping boutique could check on Foursquare who buys at their shop or 
in a similar shop, and where do they move around […] then they open the next shop there” (B11), a 
potential practice he referred to as “questionable,” though he also considered it “[…] an advantage because 
I have an interest in buying there” (B11). This sort of identification of users also bothers B5 who argued 
that using location data would invade his privacy as they could glean too much about a person: “User XY 
[…] stays there, travels a lot, seems to move around a lot, and from this they can draw conclusions about 
things like educational background, um profession, income” (B5). Information LBS providers may even 
sell to other companies is a real enough concern for him to avoid using LBS in general. Others stated their 
belief that providers generally pass their personal location information on to third parties (e.g., B8). Some 
users, however, are not at all concerned about potentially opportunistic practices of LBS providers (B2 
and B7).  
Provider Misrepresentation Risk 
Study participants also raised concerns about potentially opportunistic data collection practices by the 
studied providers. For example, B11 stated that he did not think that Find My Friends would need to store 
any location data. He said he would feel deceived if he were to find out that they record his location 
information: “[…] even if they store, where I was or when I checked where anyone was [I would feel 
cheated…] since they do not need to store my location information” (B11). Similarly, B8 was 
uncomfortable with this service provider gaining intimate knowledge of his whereabouts and storing this 
information: “I am going to turn this off. I do not want Apple to know my movement patterns […] and that 
there is a map on which one can see where I most commonly stay” (B8). Interestingly, the same 
interviewee had stated only minutes earlier that: “nowadays, I don’t give a damn if […] Apple knows 
where I am” (B8). However, study participants generally believed data collection of the two services to be 
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similar. B10, for example, stated: “They know at any given time, what you are doing even when you do not 
check in anywhere” (B10). 
Property Risk 
The perceived risks associated with the uncertainty of the mobile environment, the inability or possible 
negligence of service providers putting users’ location data at risk have a direct effect on users’ concerns 
for their own safety and that of their property and possessions. B11, for example, feels that if hackers 
gained access to users’ location information from Find My Friends by deceiving the service masking as a 
user’s friend, they could easily use this information to burgle his home. In B11’s opinion this risk is, 
however, not restricted to Find My Friends, stating that if hackers were to gain access to data stored on 
Foursquare servers, they could also use this to burgle someone’s home. B9 argues in a similar fashion, 
also not making a distinction between Find My Friends and Foursquare in this respect. 
That hackers could collect location information from these services is evidently a scary thought for 
women: Both B12 and B6 perceive this as a real threat to their personal safety: “they can look at my 
movement patterns and say: ‘Ok, I rob her or follow her, such things…’ obviously that is pretty specific 
and specific, but such things could happen” (B12); “I would be scared in some way that […] through some 
tricks people could also gain access to my location information [and…] some psychopath could intercept 
me” (B6). Also, they both considered this risk to be the same for Foursquare and Find My Friends. 
Surveillance Risk 
The mere possibility of being monitored seemingly also affects privacy perceptions: For example, B1 
referring to service providers stated: “It’s not about what they do with this data at the end of the day, but 
the feeling that one can just switch off for a moment” (B1). Others, too, feel the risk of “total surveillance” 
(B11) by corporations and governments alike (B1, B11 and B12). This risk of surveillance by potential 
future employers is a concern for B10: “I would never want to share this, since anyone can quasi follow 
you there [on Foursquare]” (B10). Particularly the option of continuous tracking by other users in Find 
My Friends left some feeling constantly under the spotlight: For example, B7: “this surveillance […] even 
if they are ultimately your friends […] you don’t always want them to know what you are doing” (B7). The 
possibility of constant surveillance also constitutes an invasion for B1: “They can theoretically check at all 
times and see what my daily routine looks like, when I am where, and that is a bit…” (B1), and B9 too 
stated that the possibility of real-time tracking bothered him (B9). In contrast, B2, as an ex-user of 
Foursquare, stated that he saw greater risk of surveillance originating from Foursquare due to the variety 
of friends: “on Foursquare you have a lot of different friends so to say…yes. And they could all monitor me 
even if I do not want this” (B2). 
Social Risk 
Loss of decisional freedom: Interviewees sometimes stated that they were concerned with the possibility 
of Find My Friends monitoring other friends’ steps as they felt this might restrict their ability to make 
decisions or affect their freedom to lie without experiencing any repercussions. For example, B10: “If I am 
in the cinema […] and I said I didn’t want him [a friend] to come with and then I told him something else, 
but you are in the cinema” (B10), and B5: “Imagine you forget to turn this off… um and you then say you 
are at home, but you are actually out. That is an own goal indeed when you use such a service” (B5). 
Others raise similar concerns (B3, B7 and B8), although this risk was perceived solely for Find My Friends 
and not Foursquare. B11 also perceives the risk of losing his freedom of choice due to personalized ads: 
“you feel quasi other-directed” (B11). 
Knowledge about personal life: Interviewees generally stated that they consider location information 
sensitive information that may uncover potentially revealing things about a person’s life. However, study 
participants only perceive this risk to apply to Find My Friends as tracking is not approved by the located 
user him- or herself. B7 states her concern that people could discover serious secrets such as medical 
conditions against one’s will: “If I am somehow sick and have to often go to the doctor, then someone can 
think: ‘oh, something is wrong there.’ These are things, which are totally secret, but since I repeatedly go 
to a certain location, I make this public then” (B7). B8 hypothetically mentions the risk of people cheating 
on their partner or other secrets being discovered.  
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Location sensitivity: Similarly, some interviewees feel that the locations themselves could potentially be 
embarrassing for them, thus representing a risk to their privacy. For example, both B5 and B8 offer the 
hypothetical example of going to a brothel to illustrate this location sensitivity risk involved in an app like 
Find My Friends. Due to the volitional nature and, thus, inherent control of check-ins on Foursquare, 
interviewees, again, did not generally consider this risk to apply to this app (e.g., B1, B3 and B11). 
Although, it should be noted that people mostly stated that they were not overly worried about location 
sensitivity for an app like Find My Friends either, as they felt they had nothing to hide (e.g., B2, B3 and 
B6). 
Stalking  
The possibility of gaining knowledge of a user’s location via Find My Friends or Foursquare gives rise to 
concerns about stalking for nearly all study participants. B1 even reduced Find My Friends to stalking: 
“you can stalk your friends with it and that is it” (B1). B11, himself an ex-user of Find My Friends, gave a 
similarly damning judgment: “I did not see the use and sense behind the app, except, you are a stalker” 
(B11). B9, too, perceived his privacy at risk from such an app “ideal for stalkers” (B9). The risk of being 
stalked, however, was not only stated for the constantly tracking application Find My Friend but for 
Foursquare too: “there is always a risk. People who misuse this, they follow someone and then you may 
wonder: ‘does that person follow me in real life too? Is he here and watches me […]?’ The risk exists” (B8). 
B5 stated that he himself would feel like a stalker only using the application. B13, mentioned that she 
could imagine a risk for her personal safety from other users: “Look for example, you originally have 
installed this app [Find My Friends] with your boyfriend, right? And then you split and you have totally 
forgotten the app […] and then he looks you up because he is a psycho […] could result in an assault” 
(B13). 
Focus Risk Facets Validation 
Provider 
 
Provider Performance Risk  
Secondary Use Risk  
Noncompliance Risk  
Provider Misrepresentation Risk  
Service Mobile Application Risk  
User 
Social Risk 
 Loss of decisional freedom 
 Knowledge about personal life 
 Location sensitivity 
 
Physical Risk  
Property Risk  
Stalking Risk new 
Table 4. Validation of LBSNS Risk Facets 
Table 4 illustrates the findings of the interviews. Proposed risk facets such as provider performance risk, 
noncompliances risk and mobile application risk were not considered as pivotal from the respondent’s 
perspective. Based on the interviews, stalking risk emerged as an additional important factor influencing 
the user’s decision on using LBSNS. Furthermore, the interviews enabled to refine social risk into three 
more specific subcategories. 
Discussion 
This study focused on the effects of perceived risk facets in the context of LBSNS usage. First, various 
salient risk factors were identified that were considered to be both applicable to the mobile domain and 
affect users’ privacy concerns. These facets (for a full list, see Table 2) provided the basis for semi-
structured interviews in which their applicability was tested and whether or not they truly represent users 
perceived risks associated with the usage of push- and pull-based LBS. The risks users associate with the 
usage of LBS can be broadly categorized as provider-related risks, user-related risks, as well as 
environment-related risks. Our qualitative study reveals that risks are predominantly attributed to the 
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provider and the environment of the user (see Table 4). Surprisingly, no risk facet was attributed to the 
service itself. This could for instance imply that proper functioning of a service is taken for granted by the 
user. 
As shown, check-in services face many risk facets with respect to privacy concerns, and the underlying in-
depth analysis on different risks can be used to adjust provider’s business strategies and to achieve initial 
understanding of customers’ concerns. For example, the underlying results can serve as guidelines for 
marketing LBSNS applications and further considerations in this field. From a business point of view 
proactively addressing issues and concerns based on the presented results may lead to developing a better 
product offering and to exploiting other business opportunities. 
Study Limitations 
The results of this study should be carefully interpreted with regard to some limitations. 
First, the scope of the study was limited to Germany. The explanatory power of this study’s findings may 
also suffer from negative effects of convenience sampling (Hair et al. 2011).  Different regulatory settings 
and laws might influence users risk perceptions such that results might differ for other countries.  
Additionally, the sample focuses on the primary age group of LBSNS: teens and young adults. Users which 
have not grown up with social networks and the respective services might consequently perceive risks 
differently. Whereas the interviews were all conducted in German, the native language of the interviewees, 
the coding, as well as the writing of the findings was done in English. Although the translations were 
cross-checked to reduce potential linguistic nuances, the results may still in parts suffer from distorted 
meanings.  It is recommended that multiple researchers evaluate a set of data in order to establish 
reliability and reduce bias (Bryman and Bell 2011). However, only one researcher was in charge of 
carrying out the data analysis.  
Further Research 
Considering the limitations and findings of the study, a number of suggestions for future research can be 
made, which will be discussed in this section. 
First, future research could extend this study’s scope to include other age categories than the one, which 
constitutes this study’s focus, namely 14-29 year olds. Age has been argued to affect information system 
technology adoption and use, but empirical evidence has had some mixed results. For example, some 
research has shown age to be positively correlated to privacy concerns (Paine et al. 2007), while a more 
recent study found that age played no significant factor in the decision to disclose personal or location 
information (Keith et al. 2013). It may, thus, be beneficial to probe deeper for the specific concerns of 
more mature age groups, especially in the context of LBS. 
Second, it may useful to conduct a quantitative cross-cultural study on the effects of these privacy facets 
on push- and pull-based LBSNS usage. This approach may prove a fruitful undertaking in order to 
compare people’s views of privacy across a wide variety of countries, as well as cultural backgrounds, and 
may provide the basis for a unified understanding of privacy in the context of LBS.  
Third, due to the subjectivity of the topic of privacy concerns, future studies should focus more on 
individual users’ character traits and examine whether or not they impact the usage of LBS. Arguably, a 
user with a high level of neuroticism may be more concerned than one with a low level of neuroticism. 
Therefore, making participants’ character traits a greater focus of future studies may shed light on an 
individual’s natural disposition to use mobile LBS. 
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